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PROPOSED MARYLAND JURY INSTRUCTION
ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION
David E. Aaronson*
This article discusses the merits of a specific jury
instruction on cross-racial identification for use in criminal
cases when eyewitness identification is the central or critical
issue, little or no corroborating evidence is presented, and the
circumstances raise doubts about the reliability of the identifi-
cation.  
A proposed instruction developed for use in Maryland
is as follows:
In this case, the defendant, _______________ (insert 
name), is of a different race than ________________ 
(insert name of identifying witness), the witness who 
has identified [him][her].  You may consider, if you 
think it is appropriate to do so, whether the fact that the 
defendant is of a different race than the witness has 
affected the accuracy of the witness’ original percep-
tion or the accuracy of a later identification.  You 
should consider that in ordinary human experience, 
some people may have greater difficulty in accurately 
identifying members of a different race than they do in 
identifying members of their own race.
You may also consider whether there are other factors 
present in this case which overcome any such difficul-
ty of identification.  [For example, you may conclude 
that the witness had sufficient contacts with members 
of the defendant’s race that [he][she] would not have 
greater difficulty in making a reliable identification.]1
This instruction is intended to supplement standard
jury instructions identifying factors to be considered in evaluat-
ing eyewitness identifications including: (1) the opportunity for
the witness to observe the offense and the person committing
the offense, including the length of time the witness had to
observe the person committing the offense, the distance
between the witness and the person committing the offense, and
the lighting conditions at the time; (2) the witness’ state of mind
at the time of the offense; (3) the witness’ degree of attention to
the person during the commission of the offense; (4) whether
the witness knew or had seen the person before; and (5) the
accuracy of any prior description of the person given by the wit-
ness. 
The jury is also instructed that it may consider the cir-
cumstances of any earlier identification that occurred out of
court, such as: (1) the length of time between the offense and
the identification; (2) any statements made by the police offi-
cer(s) prior to or during the identification procedure; (3) the
state of mind of the witness at the time of the identification; and
(4) any misidentification by the witness or failure to identify the
defendant.  In addition, jurors are instructed to consider the
credibility of the identifying witness, including any interest or
bias the witness may have in the outcome of a case and other
factors affecting credibility.
The purpose of a specific jury instruction on cross-
racial identification is to permit juries to consider the increased
possibility of misidentification in determining whether or not
there is sufficient evidence of guilt.
Jury instructions specifically tailored to safeguard
against cross-racial identification errors would serve to enhance
fairness and confidence in the criminal justice system, especial-
ly in situations where there is little or no corroborating evidence
to substantiate the eyewitness identifications.  In appropriate
cases, instructions addressing the enhanced risk of cross-racial
misidentification should be given after the general instructions
regarding identification and credibility of witnesses so that
jurors have the means to evaluate the accuracy of the identifica-
tion.
Research shows that persons of one racial or ethnic
group have more difficulty distinguishing among individual
faces of another group than among faces of their own group.2
An inaccurate identification due to the so-called “own race”
effect may result in higher wrongful conviction rates when
defendants are of different races than the witnesses who identi-
fy them.3 Studies show that persons who primarily interact
within their own racial group, especially if they are in the
majority, will better perceive and process the subtlety of facial
features of persons within their own racial group than persons
of other racial groups.4
For example, during a recent misdemeanor trial in a
Maryland state courthouse, an eyewitness to a criminal offense
identified a student attorney in the American University
Washington College of Law’s Criminal Justice Clinic, rather
than the defendant, as the perpetrator of the crime.  The eyewit-
ness, a Hispanic man, made a statement prior to trial identify-
ing the defendant, an African American man, as the perpetrator
and explained that he had known the defendant for three years.
When asked to identify the perpetrator at trial, however, he
pointed to the African American law student representing the
defendant, resulting in an immediate dismissal of the charges.5
Unfortunately, cross-racial courtroom misidentifications are
rarely as obvious as the one in this example.  
Traditional trial protections of suppression hearings,
voir dire, cross-examination of witnesses, closing arguments,
and jury instructions on the credibility of witnesses and evalua-
tion of eyewitness testimony do not adequately address the spe-
cial recognition impairments often present in cross-racial eye-
witness identifications.  Abshire and Bornstein state that
“[m]uch of the reason for juries’ erroneous convictions based
on faulty eyewitness identifications is that jurors are not very
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sensitive to the factors that determine eyewitness accuracy.”6
The additional protection of a cross-racial jury instruction is
needed, as stated by Johnson, “because the own-race effect
strongly influences the accuracy of identification, because that
influence is not understood by the average juror, because cross-
examination cannot reveal its effects, and because jurors are
unlikely to discuss racial factors freely without some authoriza-
tion to do so.”7
Although eyewitness identifications are often reliable
and persuasive evidence, thirty years of social science research
and the contributions of the Innocence Project, a national
organization dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted
persons through DNA testing, have shown that erroneous eye-
witness identifications are the single greatest
cause of wrongful convictions nationwide.
Approximately three-quarters of the more than
200 wrongful convictions in the United States
overturned through DNA testing resulted from
eyewitness misidentifications.8 Of the seventy-
seven percent of cases, where race is known,
forty-eight percent of the cases involved cross-
racial eyewitness identifications.9
Why do persons of one racial group
generally have greater difficulty identifying per-
sons of another racial group than among faces of
their own group?  Loftus, Doyle and Dysart
state:
Many possible explanations of the cross-racial effects 
have been offered; for example, the effects are due to 
differential experience with members of a different 
race, to prejudicial attitudes about members of differ-
ent races, or to different modes of processing faces of 
another race. These have been thoroughly 
reviewed.  The best explanation seems to be that peo-
ple make more mistakes on a cross-racial identifica-
tion for a number of reasons, including, but not limit-
ed to, the amount of contact with persons from other 
racial groups, the amount of attention paid to other
race persons, and time spent encoding features that are 
less useful in discriminating people from other groups  
(footnotes omitted).10
A classic study by psychologists Roy Malpass and
Jerome Kravitz compared recognition and memory of identifi-
cation of persons among students at Howard University, a pre-
dominantly black university, and the University of Illinois, a
predominantly white university.  Photographs of black and
white males were shown to the students and later the subjects
were tested.  Subjects recognized faces of their own race better
than faces of the other race.  A striking finding was that white
subjects from the University of Illinois made two to three times
as many false identifications when attempting to identify black
faces of students from Howard University than when attempt-
ing to identify white faces.11
Since the study by Malpass and Kravitz, many other
studies “have been conducted with slightly different results
from one study to another but with a generally consistent pat-
tern.”12 The studies show not only a greater difficulty in recog-
nizing faces of another race, but members of one race also have
more difficulty reconstructing faces of other races.13
Studies and collected data indicate that this “own race”
effect applies across racial groups: Caucasians, African
Americans, Asian Americans, and Latino Americans are better
able to recognize members of their own race than members of
another race.  A recent ABA report concluded: “Cross-racial iden-
tifications are generally inferior to within-race identifications.”14
For example, one study found that both Japanese and
Chinese Americans are significantly better at recognizing Asian
American faces than African American faces.15 They are also
better at recognizing African American faces than Caucasian
faces.16 Additionally, the study reported that Japanese
Americans are only marginally better at recognizing Japanese
American faces than Chinese Americans faces,
and the reverse is equally consistent for Chinese
Americans recognizing Japanese American
faces.17
The research on cross-ethnicity identifica-
tion is less clear-cut.  At least one state
supreme court, authorizing a cross-racial jury
instruction in certain situations, has held that
studies on cross-ethnicity identification—as
opposed to studies of cross-racial identifica-
tion—do not provide enough support to war-
rant a specific jury instruction.18
In United States v. Telfaire,19 the D.C. Circuit affirmed
the defendant’s conviction when the trial court refused, in the
absence of a request, to give a special instruction on identifica-
tion finding that the witness had an adequate opportunity to
observe the defendant.20 The court went on to create a model
identification instruction to deal with the shortcomings in the
identification process, though this instruction omitted consider-
ation of the races of the defendant and the witness.21 To address
this deficiency, Chief Judge David L. Bazelon in a concurring
opinion stressed the problems surrounding cross-racial identifi-
cations and advocated for the addition of the following lan-
guage to the court’s model identification instruction:
In this case the identifying witness is of a different 
race than the defendant. In the experience of many it is 
more difficult to identify members of a different race 
than members of one’s own. If this is also your own 
experience, you may consider it in evaluating the wit-
ness’s testimony. You must also consider, of course, 
whether there are other factors present in this case 
which overcome any such difficulty of identification. 
For example, you may conclude that the witness has 
had sufficient contacts with members of the defen-
dant’s race that he would not have greater difficulty in 
making a reliable identification.22
Studies and collected
data indicate that this
“own race” effect
applies across racial
groups... A recent ABA
report concluded:
“Cross-racial identifica-
tions are generally infe-
rior to within-race iden-
tifications.”
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Most circuits have approved the Telfaire recommend-
ed model identification instruction, but not the specific instruc-
tion on cross-racial identification in Judge Bazelon’s concurring
opinion.  Although many circuits agree that the recommended
model identification instruction may or should be given when
identification is the key issue in the case and the identification
testimony is uncertain, only some circuits require the instruc-
tion to be given in these circumstances.24
In 2004, the Maryland intermediate appellate court,
the Court of Special Appeals, in Smith v. State,25 affirmed the
conviction of the defendant, an African American man, of
attempted robbery and related offenses, based on the identifica-
tion and testimony of the victim, a Caucasian woman.  At trial,
the defendant’s counsel requested Chief Judge Bazelon’s jury
instruction on cross-racial identification from his concurring
opinion in Telfaire.26 The trial court refused to give the instruc-
tion, instead instructing the jury on the shortcomings of eyewit-
ness identification in general.27
In reviewing the trial record, the Court of Special
Appeals noted that the victim had significant opportunity to
observe the defendant at the time of the crime and gave the
police a detailed description immediately afterwards.28 At trial,
the victim stated that she was “extremely good with faces.”29
The victim, an artist and teacher, lived in a mixed-race neigh-
borhood and had the ability to focus on facial features.  The jury
heard the victim cross-examined and could find her credible as
an observer of human faces.30 The court held that the evidence
did not indicate that the victim had problems distinguishing the
faces of different African Americans and, therefore, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion both in refusing to give a spe-
cific jury instruction on cross-racial identification and in reject-
ing the defendant’s claim that the cross-racial identification
required special emphasis in closing argument.31
Maryland’s highest court, the Court of Appeals,
reviewing the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, agreed
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case, but
given another set of facts, the court stated that it may be appro-
priate for a trial court to give an instruction on cross-racial iden-
tification.32 The court held, however, that the trial court erred
in prohibiting defense counsel from commenting on the cross-
racial identification in its closing argument, stating that
“[g]enerally, counsel has the right to make any comment or
argument that is warranted by the evidence proved or the infer-
ences therefrom.”33 Because the victim’s identification of the
defendant was anchored in her “enhanced ability” to identify
faces, the defense counsel’s request to discuss the problems that
arise as a result of cross-racial identification should have been
allowed.34
A few state appellate courts either require or authorize
a cross-racial identification jury instruction, including
California, Utah, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.  
California
California Jury Instruction No. 2.92 includes the cross-
racial instruction in a short “laundry list” of items that may be
considered.  The California jury instruction states:
Eyewitness testimony has been received in this trial 
for the purposes of identifying the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime[s] charged. In determining the 
weight to be given eyewitness identification testimo-
ny, you should consider the believability of the eyewit-
ness as well as other factors which bear upon the 
accuracy of the witness’ identification of the defen-
dant, including, but not limited to, any of the follow-
ing:
. . . The cross racial [or ethnic] nature of the 
identification. . . .35
People v. Palmer36 is an example of a case in which
the California Court of Appeals reversed a robbery conviction
based solely on eyewitness identifications of uncertain reliabil-
ity.37 The court held on retrial that the defendant would be enti-
tled to an instruction that included, as one factor, the cross-
racial nature of the identifications.38
Utah
In 1986 in State v. Long, the Utah Supreme Court
abandoned the discretionary approach and mandated trial courts
to give the instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a
central issue and is requested by the defense.39 The Utah court
stated that a well-constructed cautionary jury instruction would
pinpoint identification as a central issue and highlight the fac-
tors that bear on its reliability.40 Furthermore, a cautionary
instruction must “respect the jury’s function and strike a reason-
able balance between protecting the innocent and convicting the
guilty.”41 The Long court noted that a proper instruction sensi-
tizes the jury to external and internal or subjective factors that
empirical research has shown to be important in determining
the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.42 The Utah
Supreme Court indicated that the following instruction would
“certainly satisfy our expressed concerns about the need for
cautionary instructions.”43
. . .You should also consider whether the witness is of 
a different race than the criminal actor. Identification 
by a person of a different race may be less reliable than 
identification by a person of the same race.44
New Jersey
The New Jersey instruction provides more specificity
than the California instruction in explaining to jurors the poten-
tial dangers of cross-racial identifications.  New Jersey permits
the jury to consider the following specific factors in the appro-
priate case: 
The fact that an identifying witness is not of the same 
race as the perpetrator and/or defendant, and whether
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that fact might have had an impact on the accuracy of 
the witness’ original perception, and/or the accuracy of
the subsequent identification. 
You should consider that in ordinary human experi-
ence, people may have  greater difficulty in identifying 
members of a different race.45
State  v. Cromedy46 is an example of a Supreme Court
of New Jersey case in which use of the suggested cross-racial
instruction should be considered.  In August 1992, an African
American man raped a Caucasian woman.  The police were
notified and received a description from the victim of an
African American male in his late 20s to early 30s, about five-
feet, five-inches tall, with a medium build, mustache, and
unkempt hair.47 Eight months later, the victim saw an African
American male across the street from her whom she thought
was her attacker.  She studied his face and gait as he walked
past her, and then went home to call the
police.48 Fifteen minutes later, the defendant
was picked up by the police, and the victim
identified him in a show-up—a process of
identification usually occurring shortly after
arrest in which the accused is usually the only
person observed by the victim—as both the
man she saw on the street and her attacker.
During the trial, the state did not present any
forensic evidence linking the defendant to the
offenses.49 Despite these circumstances, a jury
found the defendant guilty of first-degree
aggravated sexual assault.50
In Cromedy, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey rejected the state’s argument that a cross-racial
identification instruction should not be required unless there is
a demonstrated substantial agreement in the relevant scientific
community that cross-racial identification is significantly
impaired.51 In addition, the court recognized that unrestricted
use of the cross-racial charge could be counter-productive, and
it suggested that an appropriate instruction would carefully
delineate the context in which the jury is permitted to consider
racial differences.52  The court reversed the conviction and held
that “a cross-racial instruction should be given only when, as in
the present case, identification is a critical issue in the case, and
an eyewitness’s cross-racial identification is not corroborated
by other evidence giving it independent reliability.”53
New Jersey has also permitted cross-racial jury
instructions in other cases.54 However, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey recently held that the Cromedy cross-racial jury
instruction is inapplicable when a cross-ethnic identification is
involved.55 The Romero court found “insufficient data to sup-
port the conclusion that, as a matter of due process, people of
the same race but different ethnicity . . . require a Cromedy
instruction whenever they are identified by someone of a differ-
ent ethnicity.”56
Massachusetts
Although Massachusetts does not require the instruc-
tion to be given, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts has held
that “a judge should consider a request for such an instruction
with a measure of favorable intention to grant it.”57
Massachusetts courts have approved of the following instruc-
tion: 
[You] may consider the fact of any cross-racial identi-
fication and whether the identification by a person of 
different race from the defendant may be less reliable 
than identification by a person of the same race.58
The proposed Maryland model cross-racial jury
instruction draws upon the language of various federal and state
instructions, especially the jury instructions in Telfaire and
Cromedy.  This instruction should serve as a model for state
courts because it properly explains the cross-racial identifica-
tion theory, instructs the jury that it may dis-
count the validity of a cross-racial identifica-
tion, and permits the jury to trust that an iden-
tification was correct.
Similar to Telfaire and Cromedy and unlike
the California instruction, the proposed
instruction explains the meaning of the cross-
racial identification theory: “You should con-
sider that in ordinary human experience, some
people may have greater difficulty in accurate-
ly identifying members of a different race than
they do in identifying members of their own
race.”59 In addition, similar to Cromedy but
unlike the Telfaire instruction, the proposed
instruction explains to jurors that the cross-racial nature of the
identification may affect the witness’ original perception or the
accuracy of a later identification.
The proposed model instruction uses objective lan-
guage similar to Cromedy by focusing on ordinary human expe-
rience: “You should consider that in ordinary human experi-
ence, some people may have greater difficulty in accurately
identifying members of a different race than they do in identi-
fying members of their own race.”60 This contrasts with the
language of the Telfaire instruction, which takes a subjective
approach advising jurors to consider the validity of a cross-
racial identification based on their personal beliefs about this
theory: “In the experience of many it is more difficult to identi-
fy members of a different race than members of one’s own. If
this is also your experience, you may consider it in evaluating
the witness’s testimony.”61 The proposed instruction’s use of
objective language permits a juror to discount a cross-racial
identification, regardless of his or her personal experiences with
identifying persons of a different race. 
Finally, the proposed model instruction advises the
jury that it is free to consider factors that may reduce the likeli-
hood of a cross-racial misidentification, similar to the Telfaire
instruction, but unlike the New Jersey, Utah, and Massachusetts
instructions.  The proposed instruction states: “You may also
consider whether there are other factors present in this case
which overcome any such difficulty of identification.  (For 
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“In the experience of many
it is more difficult to iden-
tify members of a different
race than members of
one’s own. If this is also
your experience, you may
consider it in evaluating
the witness’s testimony.”
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example, you may conclude that the witness had sufficient con-
tacts with members of the defendant’s race that [he][she] would
not have greater difficulty in making a reliable identifica-
tion.)”62  This language is important to an identification instruc-
tion because jurors need to be made aware of the relevance of
factors other than race in determining the validity of the cross-
racial identification; for example, the opportunity of the witness
to observe the suspect and the accuracy and degree of detail of
the description.  Also, this language invites jurors to focus on
the witness’s contacts and experience with members of the
defendant’s race. 
Courts have denied cross-racial jury instructions on
the basis that jurors are adequately equipped to consider eyewit-
ness testimony in light of their own personal experiences and
common sense.63 Courts have also denied the instruction based
on the argument that it “raises that proposition to the level of a
rule of law, which implies a degree of certainty that social sci-
ence rarely achieves and comes perilously close to a comment
on the evidence contrary to the constitutional restriction.”64
Judges in many states, unlike the federal court system, are not
permitted to comment to the jury about the evidence.  
In Cromedy, the Supreme Court of New Jersey sug-
gested that a cross-racial instruction should be given only when
identification is a critical issue in the case and when the identi-
fication is not corroborated by other additional evidence that
gives it independent reliability.65
Opponents of the instruction also argue that a cross-
racial instruction injects the issue of race into a case where it
does not belong and confuses the jury.  Their concern is that
whenever the witness is of a different race or ethnic group, the
defendant may bring in race as an issue.  Merely a difference in
race between the defendant and the identifying witness, howev-
er, does not require that the instruction be given. 
Should a Preliminary Showing be Required of an
Increased Risk of Error Due to Cross-Racial Factors? 
Should courts require defense counsel to elicit infor-
mation from witnesses to determine the level of contact and
familiarity of the witness with persons of the defendant’s race
as a condition for giving the suggested jury instruction?  When
requesting the cross-racial identification instruction, some
courts have required a preliminary showing of risk that the wit-
ness may be mistaken due to cross-racial factors.66 In Miller v.
State,67 the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the defense’s
requested jury instruction regarding cross-racial identification
improperly singled out the eyewitness testimony.68 The court
further held that the cross-racial instruction was adequately
covered by the general instruction regarding eyewitness identi-
fication.69
Should Courts Permit Expert Witnesses to 
Testify on Factors Affecting the Risk of 
Mistaken Cross-Racial Identification?
Those who favor the admissibility of expert testimony
argue that it is crucial to the deliberative process that jurors are
educated on the potential errors in cross-racial identifications.
Jurors are more apt to comfortably discuss racial differences
without fear of discord in the jury room when they have
received testimony from an expert considering the possible
influence of racial differences as affecting the accuracy of the
identification.  Also, they argue that the possibility of error in
cross-racial identifications is not within the ordinary knowledge
of many jurors.70
In Brodes v. State,71 the Georgia Court of Appeals stat-
ed that expert testimony would have aided the jury in evaluat-
ing the reliability of the identification because the expert would
have testified about factors affecting the accuracy of the identi-
fication.72 The court suggested that those factors were highly
relevant in the case, which involved cross-racial identifications
by victims at gunpoint.73 The court also stated that producing
an expert was the only way to present the proffered empirical
evidence to the jury.74
On the other hand, in State v. Coley,75 the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held that expert testimony concerning eye-
witness identification is per se inadmissible because the relia-
bility of eyewitness identification is within the common under-
standing of jurors aided by skillful cross-examination and an
appropriate jury instruction.76 Also, the court held that Tenn. R.
Evid. 702, requiring that expert testimony be admissible only if
it “substantially” assists the trier of fact, requires “a greater
showing of probative force than the federal rules of evidence or
the rules of evidence from those states that have followed the
federal rules, making the per se exclusion appropriate.”77 The
court’s recommended jury instruction, however, does not
include race as a factor for the jury to consider.78
Opponents of expert testimony argue that expert testi-
mony is not needed on the cross-racial identification issue
because it is not too complicated an issue and jurors are able to
understand and apply the judges’ instructions.  Deborah
Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General in the Criminal Division
of the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, argues that
experts may be costly for defendants, confuse the jury rather
than clarify the issues, and take up time.79 A principal draw-
back of the use of expert witnesses is the lack of their availabil-
ity, especially for indigent defendants.
Some courts prefer a cross-racial instruction to expert
testimony: “We believe that the problem can be alleviated by a
proper cautionary instruction to the jury which sets forth the
factors to be considered in evaluating eyewitness testimony.”80
In Cromedy, the New Jersey court held that the defendant was
entitled to a cross-racial jury instruction, but not entitled to
expert testimony.81
In Smith v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals in
2005 stated that given another set of facts, it may be appropri-
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Conclusion
ate for a trial court to give a jury instruction on cross-racial
identification.  Defense counsel should consider requesting a
cross-racial jury instruction in situations when the risk of a
misidentification and a wrongful conviction are highest: (1)
identification is a crucial issue in the case; (2) little or no
evidence corroborating eyewitness evidence is presented;
and (3) the circumstances raise doubts about the reliability of
the identification.
A specific jury instruction on cross-racial identifica-
tion, such as the proposed model instruction, sensitizes
jurors to consider whether the fact that the defendant is of a
different race than the identifying witness has affected the
accuracy of the identification. Jurors are more apt to com-
fortably discuss racial differences with such an instruction.
The proposed model cross-racial jury instruction draws upon
various federal and state jury instructions, especially those in
Telfaire and Cromedy.  
Defense counsel in cross-racial identification situa-
tions need to find out how much contact and experience
identifying witnesses have had with persons of a defendant’s
race. Some states, such as Indiana, require a preliminary
showing of a risk that the witness may have been mistaken
due to cross-racial factors.
Prosecutors will focus on the circumstances sup-
porting the reliability of the eyewitness identification(s).
They should also highlight the degree of contact and experi-
ence of the identifying witness with persons of the defen-
dant’s race, such as their residence in a mixed race neighbor-
hood. 
When loss of liberty and, possibly, the life of a
human being are at stake, the additional safeguard of a jury
instruction on cross-racial identification, such as the jury
instruction proposed in this article, is an important tool to
help protect against the heightened risk of eyewitness
misidentification and wrongful conviction. 
DNA exonerations resulting from work of the
Innocence Project, supplemented by decades of scientific
research, dramatically spotlight eyewitness misidentification
as the leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United
States. A high percentage of these cases involve cross-racial
misidentifications. There is widespread consensus supported
by a substantial body of evidence that persons are less able
to recognize faces of a different race than their own. Cross-
racial identifications are generally inferior to within-race
identifications.
A jury instruction specifically tailored to safeguard
against cross-racial identification errors should serve to
enhance fairness and confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem.
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